Introduction
Evidence of comprehensive hazard identification is a crucial component of any aerospace certification argument. Historically, in the early stages of the aerospace safety assessment process, hazard identification has been performed through use of hazard checklists -derived from lists of previously identified or experienced hazards. The arguments used in support of this approach are predominantly based upon the amount of accumulated experience (i.e. to a large extent we know how aerospace systems fail) and the stability of the underlying domain (i.e. aerospace systems don't change a great deal from instance to instance). However, this is a reactive rather than pro-active approach to identifying hazards. Also, when looking at complex and highly integrated subsystems of an aircraft (such as a single engine controller), the lower-level hazardous failure modes are less well understood and not as stable. Completeness of the hazard identification process for such subsystems is therefore a concern.
Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) is being increasingly recommended (e.g. by the Aerospace Recommended Practice -ARP 4754 [SAE94]) as a means of performing hazard identification. However, many of the available example applications of this approach (including that given in ARP 4761 [SAE95]) are illustrated either for aircraft-level functions or sub-system functions with obvious and visible functional effects. Our experience is that it can be difficult to apply FHA for lower level aircraft systems (specifically at the level of the engine controller) where, due to the level of complexity and integration with other systems, the overall effects of functional failure are far from obvious. In this paper, we describe the problems we have encountered when applying FHA and the (partial) solutions we have proposed in order to overcome these problems.
Principles of FHA
Functional Hazard Assessment in defined as one of the preliminary activities in the safety assessment process outlined by ARP4754 [SAE94] (shown in Figure 1 ). FHA is first carried out for the whole aircraft -working from a description of aircraft functions. Then, following allocation of functions to aircraft systems, FHA is performed again for each subsystem. 
Problems Experienced when attempting FHA
The principles and method of FHA appear deceptively simple. However, when attempting to apply FHA to an engine controller, we encountered the following problems:
Defining Functions(!)
We found it hard to identify functions at the right level of abstraction from the available requirements documentation -particularly, separating functions from implementation detail. Expressing functions at too abstract a level, we found that we became 'divorced from reality' (i.e. the engineering knowledge) about how the controller operated and therefore that we were unlikely to identify 'real' new hazardous failure modes. At the other extreme, if functions were expressed at too detailed a level we found that the FHA process took too long, too much information was generated, and that we were turning FHA into a design / bottom-up (e.g. Failure Modes and Effects Analysis style) activity.
Determining 'Effect'
For systems such as the controller, that are several layers removed from the system ó environment boundary, determining the effect of function failure can be difficult. Figure 3 illustrates this problem: In order to work out the effect of a controller function failure we must be able to determine its effect on the engine, the single engine effect on the overall aircraft propulsion (i.e. multiple engines), and then the propulsion effect on the aircraft.
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Figure 3 -Propagation of 'Effect' Through Sub-system Layers
This problem is glossed-over in the standards by illustrating the technique on subsystems (e.g. wheel brake systems in ARP4761 [SAE95]) where the effect of failure can, to some extent, be considered obvious. It is much harder, e.g. for the controller, to determine the effect of failure of the 'Control IP turbine rotor tip clearances' function. In order to understand this failure we clearly require substantial design context and rationale underlying this function.
Coupling / Integration
At the controller level, the functions are heavily interdependent. FHA works best for independent functions. There is no support or structure in the technique for addressing functional dependencies. However, we were aware of critical combinations of functional failures, e.g. loss of fuel temperature control coupled with loss of communication to airframe.
The controller functions are also heavily dependent on engine / aircraft mode (e.g. Ground Idle | Take-off | Climb | Cruise | Approach | Landing). Again, there is no explicit support or structure in the technique for addressing the effect of state on functional failure.
We recognised that to consider all combinations of functions, phases etc. would be prohibitively time consuming. We therefore needed a way of focussing attention on critical combinations.
Our approach to performing FHA
To address the problems described in section 3 and FHA of the engine controller a workable and worthwhile activity we adopted the following approach:
• Strict avoidance of design terminology in defining functions
• Grouping functions by type to simplify analysis
• Identifying critical function & mode interactions to limit scope of analysis
• Having a function-flow model of consequences to help determine failure effect
Avoidance of Design Terminology
We were strict in eliminating implementation detail (and therefore design terminology) from our description of engine functions. In this way we found we arrived at the correct level of abstraction for performing the FHA. For example, defining a function as 'Control Engine Surge Margin' rather than 'Control Engine Airflow' -a particular means of controlling the surge margin.
Grouping Functions
In examining the list of controller functions we recognised a number of distinct function types. We grouped the functions according to these types, as illustrated in Figure 4 . For example, some functions continuously controlled a particular engine parameter; some functions were concerned with particular engine events and some functions were concerned with communication to the airframe. False high, False low, Total failure Using these failure types the FHA process was directed to relevant and applicable concerns, whilst being abstract enough to possibly identify new ones. The benefits of using these failure types are similar to using those gained by using guidewords in a HAZOP [MoD96] activity.
Scoping the Assessment
Prior to conducting the FHA, to scope the assessment we have proposed the use of a cross function chart, such as that shown in Figure 5 , to identify particular couplings of interest. As shown in Figure 5 the chart can be used both to describe function-to-function and function-to-mode couplings that should be addressed. Not all functions interact with other functions and not all modes are relevant to all functions. Using a chart such as this, we can direct the FHA process to particular 'hot-spots' of interest.
Consequence Loops
In order to determine the effect of a functional failure we found we needed a functional model that shows the flow of control / consequences, such as that shown in Figure 6 . Figure 6 shows how (the flow of control), and through what mechanisms (fuel flow, mechanical energy etc.), the functional areas of the engine controller interact. It also shows feedback cycles that exists and where the 'observable' effects will emerge. Using such a model, for any particular function, we can reason about the downstream observable and feedback effects of failure.
Conclusions
FHA can be hard to apply. More accurately, FHA can be hard to apply well -in a way that means we are not simply generating reams of meaningless tables, but instead are gaining a better understanding of the effect of failures and therefore a more complete list of hazardous failure modes.
Identifying and defining functions at the right level of abstraction can be a non-trivial exercise. Care must be taken when extracting functions from requirements documentation to remove premature implementation detail.
Existing FHA works best as a technique for functions that are entirely independent. However, when talking about highly integrated feedback systems, the functions are far from independent. Both function-to-function and function-mode interactions must be addressed. However, FHA size must be managed. It is necessary to clearly scope and direct the FHA process.
It can be difficult to determine the end-effect of low-level subsystem functional failures. It is useful to have a model of the 'consequence' chain that clearly identifies how functions interact and their relationship to effects that are observable at the higher levels of the system. 
References
